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ABSTRACT 
 
A holy grail for military, diplomatic, and intelligence analysis is a valid set of software agent models that act as the 
desired ethno-political factions so that one can test the effects that may arise from alternative courses of action in 
different lands. This article enumerates the challenges of such a testbed and describes best-of-breed leader and 
follower profiling models implemented to improve the realism and validity of the agent. Realistic, ‘descriptive’ 
agents are contrasted to rational actor theory in terms of the different equilibria one would expect to emerge in 
conflict games. These predictions are examined in two real world cases (Iraq and SE Asia) where the agent models 
are subjected to validity tests and a policy experiment is then run. We conclude by arguing that substantial effort on 
game realism, best-of-breed social science models, and agent validation efforts is essential if analytic experiments 
are to effectively explore conflicts and alternative ways to influence outcomes. Such efforts are likely to improve 
behavioral game theory as well. 
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INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
 
 
 
Analytic game theory is the mathematics of strategy, 
and as such, holds great promise for helping to 
understand conflicts. At the same time, analytic game 
theory has a weak record of explaining and/or 
predicting real world conflict – about the same as 
random chance according to Armstrong (2002), Green 
(2002). In the field of economics, Camerer (1999) 
points out that the explanatory and predictive powers 
of analytic game theory are being improved by 
replacing prescriptions from rational economics with 
descriptions from the psychology of monetary 
judgment and decision making. This has resulted in 
‘behavioral game theory’ which adds in emotions, 
heuristics, and so on. In this paper, we pursue the same 
approach and believe the term ‘behavioral game 
theory’ is broad enough to cover all areas of social 
science, not just economics.  
 
Specifically, the military, diplomatic, and intelligence 
analysis community would like for (behavioral) game 
theory to satisfy an expanding range of scenario 
simulation concerns. Their interest goes beyond 
mission-oriented military behaviors, to also include 
simulations of the effects that an array of alternative 
diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic 
(DIME) actions might have upon the political, military, 
economic, social, informational (psyops), and 
infrastructure (PMESII) dimensions of a foreign 
region. The goal is to understand factional tensions and 
issues, how to prevent and end conflicts, and to 
examine alternative ways to influence and possibly 
shape outcomes for the collective good.  
 
PROFILING FACTIONS AND THE 
FACTIONSIM TESTBED 
 
Our exploration begins by constructing a testbed 
(FactionSim) that facilitates the codification of 
alternative theories of factional interaction and the 
evaluation of policy alternatives. FactionSim is a tool 
where you set up a conflict scenario in which the 
factional leader and follower agents all run 
autonomously.  You are the sole human interacting and 
 using a set of DIME actions to influence outcomes and 
PMESII effects (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 –Models and Components that 
must be synthesized for a FactionSim Testbed 
 
 
Factions are modeled as in the center of Figure 1 where 
each has a leader, two sub-faction leaders (loyal and 
fringe), a set of starting resources (Economy, E, 
Security, S, and Politics, P), and a representative set of 
over 1,000 follower agents. A leader is assumed to 
manage his faction’s E- and S- tanks so as to appeal to 
his followers and to each of the other tribes or factions 
he wants in his alliance. Each of the leaders of those 
factions, however, will similarly manage their own E 
and S assets in trying to keep their sub-factions and 
memberships happy. Followers determine the level of 
the P-tank by voting their membership level (see Sect. 
3.2). A high P-tank means that there are more members 
to recruit for security missions and/or to train and 
deploy in economic ventures.  So leaders often find it 
difficult to move to alignments and positions that are 
very far from the motivations of their memberships. 
  
Despite efforts at simplicity, stochastic simulation 
models for domains such as this rapidly become 
complex. The strategy space for each leader facing 
only two other leaders is in the trillions of options, a 
number impossibly large to explore. As a result, 
FactionSim’s Experiment Dashboard (left side of 
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Fig.1) permits inputs ranging from one course of action 
to a set of parameter experiments the player is curious 
about. On the bottom left is the profile editor of the 
personalities for the leaders and sub-leaders, and of the 
key parameters that define the starting conditions of 
each of the factions and sub-factions. Certain actions 
by the player that are thought to alter the starting 
attitudes or behavior of the factions can flow between 
these two components – e.g., a discussion beforehand 
that might alter the attitudes of certain key leaders 
(Note: this action is often attempted in settings with 
real SMEs and diplomats playing our games).  
 
Game Analysis  
 
FactionSim runs a set of multiple games, G = {G1, G2, 
…, Gn} simultaneously. Within a faction one may 
observe games between rival leaders, between leaders 
and followers, and follower on follower. The across-
faction games include attempts to cooperate and/or 
compete with other factions’ leaders and followers, 
and/or attempts to contain factions aimed at your own 
downfall. For discussion’s sake, consider these as 
iterated semi-cooperative games (ISCGs). This game 
formulation is the simplest game one can analyze 
involving conflicts between (and within) factions. 
Using it helps to clarify many of the key elements of 
these conflicts.  
 
Let us next consider how FactionSim’s games might be 
treated by two types of ISCG agents, namely:   
Rational Actors: Presumed normative and devoid of 
psychic concepts as in post-WW II economic theory 
and intro game theory classes - perfectly informed, 
purely logical, constant discount rate (i), and motivated 
by self-interest to maximize their material payoffs. All 
actors have identical payoff functions where they 
compute R{E|S|P}as uncontested resources, Q as 
resources at stake, and CstA as the cost of actions. The 
expected payoff is thus: Payoff = R + Q – CstA. 
Mutual conflict or fight-fight is a well-known Nash 
equilibrium. We know also that if CxCy> FxCy, then 
mutual cooperation is Pareto optimal and in repeated 
games, if the agent histories are remembered, no agent 
is excessively powerful, and agents start with mutual 
cooperation, then the following is the well-known 
mixed strategy that will prevail: attack if provoked (tit-
for-tat) to deter other leaders from taking advantage, 
but otherwise cooperate. The subgame perfect 
equilibrium consists of long periods of cooperation 
punctuated by occasional conflicts. Ignoring rare 
conflicts, one may write the predicted payoffs for any 
given ‘rational’ agent in alliance with others as: 
 
      PAYOFFx  
0
( ) /(1 )T t
t
CxCy t i== +∑               (1) 
 
Descriptive agents:  Swedberg (2001, p.325) states "If 
sociological game theory is not to end up as an 
artificial exercise, it is absolutely essential that the 
beliefs, ideas and experiences of the actors themselves 
are moved onto center stage". One must profile the 
individuals involved to find out the inventory of items 
at stake and to build realistic agent models.  We do this 
with best-of-breed social science instruments (Sect 3). 
Such actors use these approaches to decide everything 
from R and Q, to the size of an action, to how to 
discount (i), to how much they are willing to pay for 
their gambits (CstA), etc. – one wouldn’t even expect 
to use the same formulas for normative vs. descriptive 
computations.  Aside from material payoffs, these 
agents attend to moralistic issues driven by their 
emotional value (emV) and how relationships  (ΔKxy) 
change; they may commit errors and use biased 
heuristics; and they may see games through a different 
lens (e.g., settling grievances, fast track to next life).  
For these agents, the payoff function becomes Payoff = 
R + Q – CstA  - | ΔK | + emV.   
 
Researchers like Macy & Flache (2004) show that as 
one alters agent aspirations (something equivalent to 
emV and ΔK), the stable equilibrium [1] collapses and 
the prediction of fight-fight becomes near-continual. 
Woods (2004) shows that divisibility of Q as well as 
emV and ΔK type issues must be elaborated if conflicts 
are to be settled. Results like this mean that one must 
reduce the guess work about what drives the resource 
disputes, moral dilemmas, and social relationship 
grievances.  
 
PERSONALITY PROFILING MODELS 
 
Profiling of personalities has not yet reached the stage 
of a mature science with first principles; however, there 
are best-of-breed profiling instruments with respectable 
field trials and high inter-rater reliability. These are 
useful for creating agent frameworks with greater 
degrees of realism. Such implementations, if done 
carefully, may in fact improve profiling science. 
Hendrickson and McKelvey (2002) suggest that social 
science theories, in general, need to be computationally 
formalized as agent models to show they are 
analytically adequate. These models in turn must be 
subjected to correspondence tests against real world 
phenomena to verify them (ontologic adequacy). This 
two step testing process improves the science by 
revealing the agenda for advancement.   
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Unlike the evolutionary tradition where personas are 
mutated, this approach of profiling real personalities 
within connectionist agent models allows one to watch 
the generative mechanism and to observe what they do, 
how they learn and adapt, and what macro-behavior 
emerges from the actors’ micro-decisions. Using 
profiling instruments reduces the dimensionality to the 
traits and factors they require, and where these are 
applied, we can use training datasets, fill in the traits 
and factors of archetypical as well as real characters, 
conduct validation tests, and treat these parameters as 
no longer independent variables clouding the larger 
political analyses – they exist within encapsulated 
components and only their inter-relationships to other 
parts are significant when assessing the whole. This is 
no different than systems engineering for any 
complicated device. A crash test of an automobile does 
not depend on how the pistons fire. We similarly 
encapsulate other parts of the faction model – e.g., the 
(E|S|P) resource tanks that we currently model as 
stacks of poker chips that grow or fall. One can plug in 
finer resolution models for any given tank without 
affecting overall system performance. With that in 
mind, we turn now to the best-of-breed profiling 
theories we implemented as leader and follower 
models.   
 
Profiling Leaders  
 
In FactionSim, each leader and follower is modeled 
within a framework known as PMFserv (Silverman 
2005) where the leader’s cultural values and 
personality traits are represented through Goal, 
Standards and Preference (GSP) trees. These are multi-
attribute value structures where each tree node is 
weighted with Bayesian probabilities or importance 
weights. A Preference Tree is one’s long term desires 
for world situations and relations (e.g., no weapons of 
mass destruction, stop global warming, etc.) that may 
or may not be achieved in the scope of a scenario. In 
FactionSim agents this translates into a weighted 
hierarchy of territories and constituencies (e.g., no 
tokens of leader X in resource Y of territory Z). The 
Standards Tree defines the methods a leader is willing 
to take to attain his/her preferences, and what code that 
others should live by as well. Finally, the Goal Tree 
holds short term needs the agent seeks to satisfy each 
turn (e.g., vulnerability avoidance, power, rest, etc.). 
The GSP tree is a value model editor that allows one to 
(a) implement leader and follower profile instruments 
as nodes on the trees and (b) set the weights on the 
nodes which in turn implements a personality profile 
(see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – GSP Tree Structure, Weights, 
and Activations 
 
Perhaps the best leader profiling instrument is 
Hermann (1999) who offers a descriptive theory of 
leader style that is measurable and can be fully 
implemented in this framework. After two decades of 
studying over 122 national leaders including 
presidents, prime minister, kings, and dictators, 
Hermann uncovered a set of leadership styles that 
appear to influence how leaders interact with 
constituents, advisers, or other leaders. Hermann 
determined that seven traits are particularly useful in 
assessing leadership style: need for power, control, 
openness (combines 2 traits), task vs. relationship 
focus, distrust, and in-group bias. 
 
In Hermann’s profiling method, each trait is assessed 
through content analysis of leaders’ interview 
responses as well as or other secondary sources of 
information. Hermann’s research also has developed 
methods to assess leadership at a distance, based 
mostly on the public statements of leaders. Hermann 
(1999) has developed mean scores on each of the seven 
traits. A leader is considered to have high score on a 
trait, if he or she is one standard deviation above the 
average score for all leaders on that trait.  
 
In order to implement the Hermann instrument as an 
agent model (GSP Trees), we had to do the following:   
• Need to increase power (and its inverse, 
protection) is both a long term Preference as well as a 
short term Goal. So it appears on both trees. In the 
Machiavellian and Hermann-profiled world of leaders, 
the goal tree reduces to a duality of growing vs. 
protecting the resources in one’s constituency. 
Expressing goals in terms of power and vulnerability 
provide a high-fidelity means of evaluating the short-
term consequences of actions. 
• Most of the other Hermann traits govern personal 
and cultural norms and thus appear on the Standards 
tree. 
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•  The UN GLOBE model of leaders (House, 2004) 
includes several traits like Hermann’s but also adds 
Scope of Doing and Sensitivity to Life 
(humanitarianism) which we adopt here as well. We 
also add one further trait, namely Protocol vs. 
Substance Focus as a continuum to describe the 
leader’s penchant for protocols (e.g., state visits or 
speech acts such as religious blessings) as opposed to 
taking any concrete actions. 
• Resource management doctrine – We add specific 
standards that capture the doctrine a leader adheres to 
when considering his Economic and Security tanks. 
Beneath each subnode that has a + sign, there are 
further subnodes, but under the G- and P-trees these are 
just each faction’s resources in each territory with 
valence and importance valuated weights. 
 
The structure of the GSP trees is shared by all agents.  
However, the tree weights are unique for each agent 
and thus capture individual differences that may be 
determined by culture, ideology, or personality.  Other 
papers discuss how the weights may be derived so as to 
increase credibility: e.g., see Bharathy (2006), 
Silverman (2002a,b, 2006b). An example of the 
weights is the insurgent leader shown in Figure 2. He is 
low on conformity, humanitarianism, scope of doing 
good, and treating outgroups with fairness, and high on 
exercise of power, and asymmetric warfare.  
 
GSP trees are used by the agent for all decisions – e.g., 
selecting a next game action, determining faction 
alliance moves, or deciding on a speech act. They give 
each agent a robust and individual worldview.  When 
contemplating a decision, the agent calculates the 
subjective expected utility (SEU) it expects to derive 
from every action available to it, as constrained by 
perception and chooses the alternative that maximizes 
SEU.  Thus 
 
Best Response (SEU) =Max{Σ U(ak)*Pr(ak)* Φ(rj)+ ψ} 
 
where utilities (U) for next actions, ak, are the 
anticipated E|S|P tank gains or losses the actions afford 
combined with how those affect the nodes of a given 
agent’s GSP trees. Φ(rj) is a function that captures the 
strength of positive and negative relationships one has 
with agent or object j that are effected or spared by ak, 
and ψ handles merging and discounting (decay) prior 
GSP activations. Probabilities assess the likelihood of 
success or failure. Also, the GSP tree weights adhere to 
principles of probability; e.g., all child node insights 
add to unity beneath a given parent, activations and 
weights are multiplied up a branch, and no child has 
multiple parents (independence). Although we use 
fixed weights on the GSP trees, the succeed and fail 
reservoirs on each node (see Fig.2) serve to render 
them dynamic and adaptive to the agent's current 
needs. Thus, when a given success reservoir is filled, 
until ψ decays it, that tends to nullify the importance of 
the weight on that node (or amplify it if the failure 
reservoir is filled). In this fashion, one can think of a 
form of spreading activation (and deactivation) across 
the GSP structure as a game proceeds.  
 
Profiling Followers 
 
We introduce three refinements in order to also be able 
to model the values and motivations of followers – (1) 
additions to the GSP trees, (2) a group-affinity 
profiling instrument, and (3) group transfer dynamics 
(exit, voice, and loyalty). In keeping with analytic 
adequacy, each of these refinements is an 
implementation of a well-respected model drawn from 
the social sciences. In terms of the Goal tree changes, 
the leader goals are still there but may be zeroed out if 
this is strictly a follower, or may be left in at some 
degree of importance if this is a mid-level leader. For 
followers in general, where day-to-day existence is a 
struggle, the first four of Maslow (1987)’s hierarchy of 
needs is considered a useful representation of the range 
of short term goals that a person might have to be 
concerned about. Without regard to order of 
achievement, these are added to the G-tree under the 
node labeled ‘individual’ (see Figure 2). Each of these 
nodes are activated by lower level branches on the tree 
pertaining to physiology, to relationship dynamics, or 
to the affinity instrument described below. In terms of 
the Standards Tree, we add Conformity Assertiveness 
as a way to capture Hofstede(2003)’s Power-Distance 
and Individualism factors (respect authority, conform 
to society) and the GLOBE study’s  Assertiveness 
factor.  
 
For determining an individual’s group affinity, one 
needs an instrument that measures it. The instrument 
that we have adopted here involves Eidelson and 
Eidelson (2003) who have developed a five belief 
(“dangerous ideas”) framework for better 
understanding the psychology of individual-group 
dynamics particularly relevant to conflict settings. 
These beliefs are considered particularly important 
influences on a group member’s perceptions of his/her 
group’s current circumstances and future prospects. 
Eidelson worked with us to help us implement his 
model within the GSP tree framework. Thus an agent 
who is profiled within the GSP trees can be seen to be 
harboring “Dangerous Ideas” to the extent that the five 
beliefs are present as follows: 
 •Vulnerability (V)  Revolves around a sense of living 
in harm’s way amid constant threat and peril. 
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Computed as the inabilitiy of agent i to make progress 
toward its objectives (i.e., G- and P-tree successes 
minus failures). 
•Injustice (I).  Perception of being a victim of 
mistreatment by specific others or by the world at 
large.  Computed as the amount of agent i’s  G-tree 
failures attributable to others who violate agent i’s S-
tree, minus G-tree successes that others cause. 
•Distrust (D).  The presumed hostility and malicious 
intent of other individuals or other groups, computed as 
the amount to which agent i’s S-tree is violated by 
others. 
•Superiority (S).  Conviction of being better than 
others—morally superior, chosen, entitled. Computed 
as agent i’s perception of disutility or consequences to 
other agents and groups it dislikes of agent i's G-tree 
achievements. 
•Helplessness (H).  Refers to perceived inability to 
influence or control events and outcomes; self-
perpetuating because it diminishes motivation. 
Computed as the world’s disutility: ie, sum of all GSP 
tree failures. 
 
With this framework, depending on the perceiver, two 
agents may view the same group as superior or inferior, 
as suffering grave injustices or as exaggerating minor 
slights, as helpless or capable of effective action, and 
so on. The agents compute the possibilities. Thus if a 
viewer sees a group as vulnerable and he doesn’t want 
to be vulnerable, there will be negative activations for 
remaining loyal to this group and following its action 
choice policies. Conversely less negative (and possibly 
positive) activations will be afforded for the member 
who exits away from this group perceived as 
vulnerable.  
 
Mathematically, the reader may recall Φ(rij) from the 
prior section. Here we examine the case where j is a 
group (or leader) A and the term refers to the 
membership, relationship, or strength of affinity of 
agent i to group A. An agent i can belong to multiple 
groups at varying strength according to:  
 
Φ(riA) = (SuperiorityA x GSPcongruenceiA) / VIDAi 
 
where, Superiority and VID (=V+I+D) are from 
Eidelson instruments if available, else derived by GSP 
trees of agent i in reacting to leader or group A.  
 
Groups are characterized by GSP weights for the 
average of all members as well as by property lists 
defined a priori (religion, political system, corruption, 
maturity, etc.), and salience factors. GSP congruence is 
estimated using the sum of the means square 
differences in the GSP nodes. GSPcongruence = 1 – 
Sqrt[Sum[(wi1 –wi2)^2], which is the correlation of 
the weights between two GSP trees. If an agent is in 
Group B, it will not be drawn to a Group C whose GSP 
archetype is substantially incongruent to its own. If an 
agent is in a group (or under control of a leader) whose 
average GSP is greatly different from its own, the 
agents tend to reduce membership (P-tank 
contributions) and use Voice to resist the leader or 
attempt to Exit to another group.  
 
If agent i desires to exit from any group A to join any 
C, this is governed by the delta in utility of 
membership in each group plus a cost factor adjusted 
for transfer rate or demand elasticity. If the delta is 
positive, or larger than some loyalty factor, exit may 
occur. Let, this delta be: 
 
ΔΦj = [ (U(ΦC) +COSTTR ) / TRAC  ] - U(ΦA) 
where,       
U(Φ)         =  utility of membership, found from GSP 
trees 
COSTTR    = cost of migration, land costs, and lost 
opportunity costs 
TRAC =Transfer Rate or group porosity, a measure 
of ease of entry to or exit from group A to group C,   
TR varies between (0,-1) and grows larger as porosity 
grows. Salience is the extent to which a group permits 
exiting by ingroup members, and entry by outgroup 
members. It is the porosity permitted by the group. 
There is a tuple or value pair that gives both 
salienceForEntry and salienceForExit.  The demand 
elasticity for exiting a group is 1/TR.  
 
The followers compute their grievance state for each 
faction, ranging from –4 to +4 an use this to determine 
their actions. As an example, suppose an agent 
identifies himself with Faction B, but lives under the 
rule of Faction A. The top state (GS+4) is total support 
of a given Group, say A. A faction getting a mid-point 
grievance scale (GS-0) means that agent is undecided 
and/or helpless to resist what A wants. At the other 
extreme of GS-4, the Faction B agent who lives under 
Faction or Leader A has already joined a resistance 
faction C working against A.  At the extremes on either 
end, the agent will submit to militaristic commands of 
the leader of that group, while at the next lower level it 
will be only willing to go to protests, and verbally and 
economically support the activities of that group’s 
leaders. Of course, exit from A and joining of C is 
governed by TR, and a several tick waiting interval to 
be sure the agent doesn’t change its stance. 
 
 
 
A C ExitA EnterC iCTR Salience Salience GSPcongruence→ = × ×
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EXPERIMENTS 
 
The previous sections synthesized social science 
theories pertinent to faction conflict and implemented 
them as agent models. Here we present two real world 
conflicts. Each begins with various validity tests to see 
if the agents correspond to the real world and if the 
underlying mechanisms seem adequately represented. 
A key policy parameter is then systematically varied in 
each experiment to learn the elasticity of conflict to 
that course of action. 
 
Elasticity of Conflict in Iraq Due to Outside 
Support 
 
During the spring 2006, five student teams assembled a 
total of 21 PMFserv leader profiles across 7 real world 
factions so that each faction had a leader and two sub-
faction leaders. The seven factions – government (2 
versions - CentralGov and LoclGov), Shia (2 tribes), 
Sunnis, Kurds, and Insurgents – could be deployed in 
different combinations for different scenarios or 
vignettes. The leader and group profiles were 
assembled from strictly open source material and 
followed a rigorous methodology for collecting 
evidence, weighing evidence, considering competing 
and incomplete evidence, tuning the GSP trees, and 
testing against sample datasets [see for example 
Bharathy (2006)]. A well-known fundamentalist Shia 
leader’s GSP tree was shown in earlier Figure 2.   
 
Validation testing of these models was run at one of the 
military commands for 2 weeks in May 2006. They 
assembled 15 SMEs across areas of military, 
diplomatic, intel, and systems expertise. Within each 
vignette the SMEs attempted dozens of courses of 
action across the spectrum of possibilities (rewards, 
threats, etc.). One interesting COA is reflected in 
earlier Figure 1 by the vertical arrow on the left of the 
chart linking the player to the Personality Editor. That 
is, a popular COA of the diplomats was to ‘sit down’ 
with some of the persuadable leaders and have a strong 
talk with them. This was simulated by the senior 
diplomat adjusting that leader’s personality weights 
(e.g., scope of doing good, treatment of outgroups, etc.) 
to be what he thought might occur after a call from 
President Bush or some other influential leader.  The 
SME team playing the MNC presented their opinions 
at the end of each vignette. The feedback indicated that 
the leader and factional models corresponded with 
SME knowledge of their real-life counterparts. They 
accepted the profiling approach as best in class and 
invited us onto the team for the follow on.  
 
Here we show an illustrative policy experiment on 4 
factions initially organized into two weak alliances 
(dyads): (i) CentralGov trying to be secular and 
democratic with a Shia tribe squarely in their alliance 
but also trying to embrace all tribes, (ii) a Shia tribe 
that initially starts in the CentralGov’s dyad but has 
fundamentalist tendencies, (iii) a secular Sunni tribe 
that mildly resents CentralGov but does not include 
revengists, and (iv) Insurgents with an Arab leader 
trying to attract Sunnis and block Shia control. Each 
faction has a leader with two rival sub-leaders (loyal 
and fringe) and followers as in Figure 1 – all 12 are 
named individuals, many are known in the US. This is 
a setup that should mimic some of the factional 
behaviors going on in Iraq, although there are dozens 
of political factions there in actuality.   Figure 3 
summarizes the outcomes of three sample runs (mean 
of 100 trials each) over a 2 year window. The vertical 
axis indicates the normalized fraction of the sum across 
all security tanks in these factions, and thus the strip 
chart indicates the portion of the sum that belongs to 
each faction. Rises and dips correspond either to 
recruiting and/or battle outcomes between groups. The 
independent variable is how much outside support is 
reaching the two protagonists – CentralGov and 
Insurgents. When CentralGov and Insurgents are 
externally supported (3A), CentralGov aids the Shia 
militia economically while the Shia battle the 
Insurgents.  Fighting continues throughout the 2 year 
run. A take-away lesson of this run seems to be that 
democracy needs major and continuous outside help, as 
well as luck in battle outcomes and some goodwill 
from tribes for it to take root. When only the Insurgents 
are supported (3B), the CentralGov is crippled by 
Insurgent attacks and civil war prevails. When the 
borders are fully closed and no group receives outside 
support (3C), the insurgency ultimately fails, but the 
CentralGov becomes entirely reliant upon the Shia 
group for military strength- a puppet government. 
These runs suggest the elasticity of conflict with 
respect to outside support is positive, and with no 
interference, the country seems able to right itself, 
although we in the West might not like the outcome. Of 
course these runs only include 4 of the many factions 
one could set up and run, plus due to page limits, we 
only displayed the effects of actions upon the Security 
Tank, and not other resources of the factions. 
 
Earlier we asserted the ΔK  and emV terms of payoff 
are vital to game theoretic formulations.  A human 
behavior model such as PMFserv is able to help the 
analyst to generate and understand these, though we 
omit the strip charts of changing ΔK and emV strengths 
due to page limits. As contrasted with normative 
agents, factions in our runs fight almost constantly and 
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are more likely to attack groups with which they have 
negative relationships and strong emotions.  
Relationship and emotions also factor into the 
formation of alliances.  For example, across all runs, 
CentralGov has a friendly relationship towards the 
Shia, who are moderately positive back.  This leads to 
CentralGov giving aid to the Shia and consistently 
forming an ally.  Likewise the Sunni Secular have 
slight positive feelings towards the Insurgents, and are 
more likely to assist them, unless others are more 
powerful.  Finally, some action choices seem to have 
purely emotional payoffs.  For example, from an 
economic perspective, the payoff from attacking an 
enemy with zero economy is zero - a wasted turn.  Yet 
in run 2c, when the Insurgents fail, the Shia still 
occasionally attack them simply because the Insurgents 
are their enemy. This seems to be a case where  
emotional are at least as important as material payoffs.  
 
 
Figure 3 – Military Power of Iraqi Factions Under 
Alternate DIME actions (mean of 100 runs). 
 
Impact of Leader Action on Follower Choices: 
FactionSim for SE Asia 
 
While the previous section focused on leader profiles, 
this Section adds the profiles of followers and the 
decisions that result. Without naming the actual 
country or leader, it has a Buddhist majority and 
government. During the 1990s, the country was 
relatively stable, however, in the last few years, the 
rural provinces have seen a rise of Muslim separatist 
sentiment. The Buddhist Leader branded the separatists 
as bandits, and sent police from the north to handle 
protesters in the Muslim provinces. We obtained a 
database of the events with civilian injury and death 
and classified the incidents based on the size and 
intensity of the incident. The incidents were aggregated 
and plotted against time. The data was then 
longitudinally separated into ‘independent sets’ with a 
training set consisting of Jan-June 2004 while the test 
set began July 2004 and ran till Dec 2004 ending just 
before the tsunami.  
 
Table 1 - Muslim Faction Shifting from Relatively 
Cooperative (GS0-2) to Largely Fighting (GS3 & 
GS4) 
(2 years, average of 30 repeat trials) 
Starting State (Avg of Weeks 1 & 2) 
Muslim Population at Start Is Neutral 
with Few Grievances Registering  
End State 
(Avg. Weeks 
103 & 104)  
GrievanceState0 - Neutral 30 6% 
GrievanceState1 - Disagree 55 1% 
GrievanceState2 - Join Oppost 15 37% 
GrievanceState3 - Nonviolent 0 
GrievanceState4 - Fight-Rebel 0 17% 
TOTAL 100 100%  
 
The training dataset was used to profile and tune the 
following types of agents for PMFserv (Eidelson was 
contracted to profile the Muslims in his instrument): 
• Buddhist Group-Leader (structure of his GSP trees 
are in Fig 2) - data indicates harsh, cruel, task, corrupt, 
wealthy, successful. Sends worst behaving cops down 
to provinces, never discourages brutality. 
• Muslim Group – Rural villagers lead by a local 
sultan agent and sorted into two archetypical 
groupings: 
• Loyal Muslims  - Despite lack of cultural freedom, 
muslim schools, etc. they are law-abiding, rural family 
members who want some autonomy.  
• Fringe Muslims – tend to be sons of Moderates 
who were Wahhabi and college-trained, now 
39%
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unemployed, running religious schools in family 
homes. 
• Separatist Group – not profiled, just a place-
holder, initially with no members. Scripted to 
periodically attack Buddhists. 
 
In PMfserv, we profiled the Buddhist leader, and 161 
Muslim agents including 1 Sultan, 80 loyals, and 80 
fringe agents. We interoperated these with a cellular 
automata that is known as the Civil Violence (CV) 
model (Epstein et al., 2001). CV involves two 
categories of actors, namely 1,200 villagers and a 
variable number of cops. Muslim villagers and may be 
actively rebellious or not, depending on their 
grievances. ‘Cops’ are the security tank forces of the 
Buddhist Leader, who seek out and arrest actively 
rebellious agents. The main purpose of introducing CV 
is to provide a social network for the cognitively 
detailed PMFserv villagers to interact with. The 
Buddhist Leader examines the state of the world and 
makes action decisions to assist or suppress villagers 
(e.g., pay for Buddhist schools, add more cops, reduce 
cop brutality, etc.). The 161 PMFserv agents then 
assess their view of the world, react to how cops handle 
protester events, how their GSPs are being satisfied or 
not by leader actions, and to their emotional construals. 
The grievance level, leader legitimacy, and group 
membership decisions by 160 archetypical villagers in 
PMFServ are passed to 160 agents they control in the 
cellular automata. These agents influence neighbors in 
the population who spread news and form their own 
view of the situation. The number of Civil Violence 
villagers in each level of grievance (neutral through 
Fight Back as shown in the rows of Table 1) are added 
up and this information  is passed back to PMFserv to 
help determine its starting level of grievance for the 
next cycle of reactions to Buddhist Leader’s actions. 
The left side of Table 1 shows the starting values as 
percent of Muslim agents that occupy each Grievance 
State. By the end of the run, the right side of Table 1 
shows the emergence of a majority of the population 
resisting and fighting (non-violent as well as violent).  
Specifically, it shows what percent of the population 
has been shifted from Neutral Grievance to higher 
states (recall the scale of earlier Section 3): GS0 
(neutral) through GS4 (fight back).   
 
We compare this simulated grievance over time to a 
proxy consisting of the incident severity – a weighted 
average of actual fatalities and injuries, where injuries 
are simply counted (w=1), but the weight on fatalities 
is 100. This was computed from the test dataset 
mentioned earlier (not the training data). To conduct 
the comparison, we applied the non-parametric 
Kendall's Tau measure of correlation. With a two sided 
test, considering the possibility of concordance or 
discordance (akin to positive or negative correlation), 
we can conclude that there is a statistically significant 
lack of dependence between base case simulated 
grievance and observed incident severity rankings at a 
confidence interval of 88%. In sum, the null hypothesis 
is rejected and real (test interval) incident data and 
simulation results are correlated. 
 
As to the leadership, in the test dataset, the real 
Buddhist leader made 52 decisions affecting the 
population.  We sorted these into positive, neutral, and 
negative actions. In the simulated world, the PMFserv 
clone made 56 action decisions in this same interval. 
At this level of classification (positive, neutral, 
negative), the mutual entropy (M) statistic between the 
real and simulated agents was less than 0.05, indicating 
significant correlation between real and simulated 
agent choices. This high degree of correlation exists 
only for the aggregate summary of positive, neutral, 
negative actions. If we try to correlate the precise 
negative action chosen or when it occurs, the 
correlations deteriorate rapidly. 
 
An interesting experiment is to see how this outcome is 
affected by altering the Buddhist leader’s policies. To 
do so, we can alter his personality (e.g., outgroup are 
targets, sensitivity to life, scope of doing good, etc.) by 
15% in either direction. Reducing these is equivalent to 
what the SMEs in the Iraqi case study attempted when 
they had Bush call and try to convince a given leader to 
be more tolerant. Raising these up by 15% is what 
might happen if he grew more autocratic. Since the 
Leader’s attributes lead directly to shifts in his course 
of action selections, these three versions of the leader 
were run to set up a range of potential futures for the 
followers. Thus, the y-axis of Figure 4 shows 
increasing losses of civil rights or the Inverse Quality 
of Citizenship (InvQtyCitizenship) as measured by the 
Muslim Group’s calculated grievances (or VID). The 
x-axis shows the decision of these agents to retain 
membership in the Buddhist-lead Government (these 
are the members of GS0, GS1, and GS2). Agents who 
leave and join the separatists (GS3 and GS4) are not 
appearing in this plot.  The plot thus shows that as long 
as conditions are not too intolerable, the entire 
population cooperates and remains. As conditions 
worsen, more and more agents exit and membership 
shrinks. This is what Hirshman (1970) refers to as the 
demand curve for civil rights. In FactionSim, we are 
able to fit the following linear regression to this 
demand curve with an R-square of 0.79 
 
InvQltyCitizenship = 1.35- 0.83 Membership_as_ Fraction 
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Figure 4 – Derived Demand Curve for Civil Rights 
by Faction Y’s Followers 
 
The Buddhist leader’s ingroup bias, financial wealth, 
narrow scope of helping only his own faction to the 
north, and willingness to use violent repression seem to 
combine in the real world (and in our model of him) 
and make him unable to comprehend this new reality. 
In the summer of 2005, he had to impose martial law 
on these provinces to try and quell the separatist 
movement. In the summer of 2006, with the approval 
of the monarch, a military junta removed him from 
power due to his mismanagement of this situation and 
economic issues.  
 
LESSONS LEARNED AND NEXT STEPS 
 
The primary argument against rational game theory is 
its poor track record of prediction in matters of real 
world conflict primarily because it often simplifies the 
game and agents to the point that they bear little 
resemblance to the real world. Behavioral Game 
Theory seeks to overcome this dilemma, however, 
there is a lack of first principles in the social sciences 
for modeling agents. The field offers best-of-breed 
theories and instruments, but these exist in reductive 
silos (specialties) and few of these have computational 
implementations. To pass the test of analytic adequacy, 
we needed to map a number of social science models 
into a common utility-theoretic formalism and integrate 
them together into a faction modeling framework – 
e.g., Hermann, Hofstede, UN Globe, Eidelson, 
Hirshman, and so on. This synthesis was necessary 
(and successful) in order to have agent models capable 
of playing the roles of real world leaders and followers 
in rival factions. Such an integration, however, exposes 
the edges of the individual models and identifies an 
agenda for synthetic research. Did we include/exclude 
the right set of profiling factors? Does our 
implementation preserve the original intent? Did we fill 
in the gaps properly? Can the merged trait set be 
revalidated? We summarize working with one of these 
scientists and found him positive about such an agenda, 
and confirmed that other scientists would be similarly 
open to a synthetic agenda. Despite having worked 
reductively to reach their position of prominence, it 
seems that synthesis is a path forward that many in the 
field are willing to embrace. 
 
In terms of ontologic adequacy of the current faction 
model synthesis, this research has tried to explore its 
robustness and cross-sample fitness.  It is worth 
dwelling a bit on the benefits that were observed and 
the lessons learned from the case studies of this paper. 
For one thing, the descriptive agents passed validity 
assessment tests in both conflict scenarios attempted—
our current day Iraqi leader agents were passed after 
extensive subject matter expert evaluation and the SE 
Asia leader and followers passed separate 
correspondence tests (correlations of over 79% on 
average). Validity is a difficult thing to claim, and one 
can always devise new tests. A strong test, however, is 
the out-of-sample tests that these agents also passed. 
Thus the SE Asian leader and followers were trained 
on different data than they were tested against. Further, 
the complete structure of the model of the leaders was 
originally derived in earlier studies of the ancient 
Crusades (Silverman et al. 2005) and this was 
transferred to the SE Asian and Iraqi domains. The 
only thing updated was the values of the weights for 
GSP trees and various other group relations and 
membership parameters – derived from open sources. 
So the structure of the leader model also survived and 
passed two out-of-sample tests relative to the Crusades 
dataset.  
 
This article concludes with two experiments, one for 
assessing the elasticity of conflict in Iraq with respect 
to outside support, and the other for determining rate of 
radicalization of the population (and its inverse, 
demand for civil rights). These experiments explain 
what has and is being observed, and hence illustrate the 
promise of descriptive agents for extending game 
theory. The title of this article may be a bit of an 
overstatement, but using profiling as the basis of 
descriptive agent models does seem to be the correct 
approach for sociological game theory. ‘Correctness’ is 
more about the generative mechanisms inside the 
agents than whether any given predictions are accurate. 
If the generative mechanisms are roughly ‘correct’, one 
can have trust that experiments on these agents will 
yield useful insights about the alternative policies that 
influence them.  Both experiments presented here pass 
initial adequacy tests and illustrate how analysts might 
use agent tools to explore policy alternatives and to 
identify parameter sensitivities and robustness. We also 
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hope the results illustrate this as a promising research 
direction with further research steps warranted. 
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